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Abstract
This study examines the role of director reputation using a sample of outside director appoint-
ments. Relative to existing literature, we focus on outside director appointments involving
CEO award winners. Exploiting the award-induced change in a director’s reputation, we are
able to show that investors react more positively to the appointment of outside directors they
perceive as more reputable. We find that this ’reputation premium’ is approximately 2%,
and robust across a range of subtests that control for a wide range of possibly confounding
influences.
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1 Introduction
Reputation is a valuable commodity in the market for outside directors (Fama, 1980;
Fama and Jensen, 1983). Recent research in particular has set out to understand the
intricacies and implications of director-level reputation (Masulis and Mobbs, 2016,
2014; Jiang et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2016).
One area where reputation is particularly important but has not been directly
studied is director appointments. Kaplan and Reishus (1990), for example, argue
that while boards retain directors based on loyalty and relationships, director ap-
pointments are largely made based on reputation. The appointment of Leonard D.
Schaeffer, CEO of WellPoint, as a director to Providian Financial provides an exam-
ple of the importance of reputation in communicating rationale for appointments,
and highlights how investors may be positively (or negatively) swayed based on the
reputation conferred through the appointment announcement:
“Mr. Schaeffer was recently selected by BusinessWeek magazine as one
of the "Top 25 Managers of the Year," and by WORTH magazine as
one of the "50 Best CEOs in America" for his leadership of WellPoint,
one of the nation’s largest publicly traded health care companies. Well-
Point operates in California as Blue Cross of California and as UNICARE
Life & Health Insurance Company throughout the rest of the nation.”
(Business Wire, 14 February 2001, retrieved from LexisNexis)
It is not clear, however, whether firms benefit from the appointment of a reputable
director and how investors view such appointments. Do investors recognize reputa-
tion as a resource and an incentive device that motivates directors to act in their
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best interest? Or do they take a critical stance and view highly reputable directors
as heavily time constrained directors waiting to “trade-up” as described in Masulis
and Mobbs (2014) and take board positions at more prestigious firms? Given the
difficulty in measuring and quantifying reputation there are no studies that have di-
rectly studied director reputation using outside director appointments and its impact
on firm value. This study attempts to close this gap.
The hypothesis of our paper is that investors recognize and value director repu-
tation and accordingly react more positive to the announcement of a director they
perceive as more reputable. In particular, we expect investors to react significantly
more positive to the appointment of a CEO that has won a CEO award. The CEO
award serves as a public signal of the CEO’s status and reputation, promoting the
CEO to something like a “celebrity” (Malmendier and Tate, 2009). Further, firms
derive a certification benefit from the appointment of an active CEO (Fich, 2005;
Fahlenbrach et al., 2010). Investors view the appointment of an active CEO more
favourable than the appointment of a retired CEO or an early-career executive.
We use a sample that only consists of CEO award winners and evaluate investor
reactions to their appointments as outside directors across different stages of their
career before and after they win the first CEO award. We collect outside director
appointments for individual CEO award winners from LexisNexis. Our final sample
consists of 432 first-time director appointments of 238 individual directors from 1977
to 2015.
The approach presented in this paper has important advantages. Most existing
studies, for example, compare investor reactions to CEO director appointments to
those of non-CEO director appointments (Fich, 2005; Fahlenbrach et al., 2010). This
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empirical approach, however, captures differences in the quality of directors rather
than providing insights in respect to director reputation (Adams et al., 2010). And
finally, using an event study we are able to circumvent sample selection concerns
common in most studies in this area (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).
The key result in this study is consistent with recent research pointing to the im-
portance of director-level reputation in the market for outside directors. We find con-
vincing evidence that, across our sample, investor reactions are significantly stronger
for the appointments of CEOs who have won an award. We call this the reputa-
tion premium. The premium ranges from 2.02% to 2.10%. For the average firm in
our sample, this short-term value effect translates into an economically substantial
increase in market value of between $591 and $614 million.
However, as in Fich (2005) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2010), the findings could be
a reflection of differences in perceived director quality. To mitigate those concerns,
we re-estimate our baseline regression for a subsample of just active CEOs. Again,
we find that investors react significantly more positive to the announcement of CEO
director appointment after the CEO has won an award.
Our findings confirm that reputation is an important commodity for outside di-
rectors. Further, we show that the appointment of a highly reputable director leads
to a significant short-term value effect. The findings underscore that firms are re-
warded for appointing directors based on their reputation. The findings presented
throughout this paper allow valuable insights in the intricacies of the labour market
for outside directors.
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2 Data and descriptive statistics
We use a hand-collected list of CEO awards, in line with Malmendier and Tate
(2009) and Shemesh (2014). The awards are from different sources such as Busi-
ness Week, Financial World, Forbes, Chief Executive, Morningstar.com, Electronic
Business Magazine, Industry Week and the Harvard Business Review. In total, our
sample includes 839 CEO awards between 1975-2013. After accounting for those
CEOs who have received multiple awards, we identify 582 individual award-winning
CEOs.
Using the names of those individual award-winning CEOs, we search the
Lexis/Nexis data retrieval system for newspaper articles and press releases covering
director appointments. We exclude appointments that were announced alongside
other major company news such as dividend announcements, press releases around
appointments or retirements of executives and directors or proposed acquisitions.
Second, we exclude appointments that constitute a director re-election (Fich, 2005).
Following this procedure yields a total of 920 outside director appointments for 269
individual directors.
For every appointment we collect information from sources such as Who’s Who
in Finance and Business and NNDB, accounting data from Compustat and stock
market data from CRSP. Our final sample for which all required information is
available consists of 432 first-time director appointments from 1977 to 2015 of 238
individual directors who at some point over their careers win a CEO award. We
then follow the standard methodology of Dodd and Warner (1983) and estimate
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using the market model for 1 year of trading
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data prior to the event window1.
Information about the, variable definition, variable construction, director sample
and firm characteristics are presented in Tables 1, 2. We see from Table 2 that at
the time of their appointment as an outside director 58% are active CEOs and 27%
are retired. The majority of award winners in our sample are male (>90%). Approx-
imately 5% of the appointees are founders or co-founders and a similar proportion
constitutes appointments of individuals who primarily work outside the US. More-
over, at the time of appointment, the average director holds 2.2 corporate board
seats. In respect to education, approximately 13% of the directors in the sample
hold a Ph.D., J.D. or M.D. and almost 30% have received at least part of their edu-
cation in an Ivy League institution. Finally, we find that just over half (57%) of the
appointments occur after the director has won the first CEO award. On average, the
directors in our sample win approximately 1.5 awards throughout their career.
The average appointing firm in our sample is very large with $46 billion in total
assets and a market capitalization of $29 billion, has a market-to-book value of 3.4,
research and development expenses of 6%, and a return on asset of 13%. CARs for
director appointment announcements are positive across all event windows and range
from 0.3% to 0.6%.
3 Empirical strategy
To formally test our hypothesis, we estimate the following regression model:
CARi = α0 + β1CEOi + β2FirstAwardi + β3CEO × FirstAwardi + β4X ′i + µi, (1)
1We also estimate CARs with market-adjusted returns to eliminate the possibility that a bias in the market model
parameters are driving our results. The results in our main analysis are robust to the use of market-adjusted returns.
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where CARi is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return of director announcement
i. CEO is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is the CEO of another firm
at the time of appointment. First Award is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
director has won a CEO award at the time of the appointment. CEO×FirstAward
is an interaction effect that is equal to 1 if the director is the CEO of another firm
and has won an award at the time of appointment. Control variables (Xi) include
director and firm characteristics described below.
To ensure the robustness of our results we re-estimate a similar model for a subset
of 237 outside director appointments that occured while the award winner was a
CEO in order to isolate the impact of award winning reputation from quality of
appointment. This results in a reduced estimation equation of:
CARi = α0 + β1FirstAwardi + β2X
′
i + µi, (2)
We include control variables to capture different stages of the director’s career
(Other Chief Executive and Other Executive) and the total number of awards as
a measure of ability (Total Number of Awards). We include a control variable for
gender (Female) because female executives have been shown to behave differently
compared to their male counterparts (Faccio et al., 2016). As a proxy for academic
excellence and ability, we include an indicator variable for whether or not the di-
rector received part of his education in an Ivy League institution (Ivy League) and
whether or not the director has a Ph.D or equivalent (Ph.D./J.D./M.D). Further
controls include an indicator variable for whether or not the director is a founder or
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co-founder (Founder/CoFounder), a control for whether or not the appointee works
in the US (International Appointment). We include the total number of board seats
held by the director (Number of Directorships) (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Falato
et al., 2015) and an indicator variable to identify appointments of industry CEOs
(Industry CEO)2. To control for firm characteristics, we include a measures of firm
size (LN(Assets)), firm value (Market-to-Book), research intensity (R&D Expense)
and the contemporaneous (ROA) and lagged operating profitability (ROAt−1). Def-
initions of all variables are contained in Table 1.
4 Investor reaction to director appointments
We now evaluate the findings to determine whether investor reactions differ according
to a director’s reputation. In particular, we evaluate whether investor reactions are
significantly stronger after a CEO has won a CEO award. Beginning with univariate
results presented in Table 3, and remembering that our entire sample are CEOs at
some point in their career and award winners at some point in their career: we find
consistently more positive announcement returns for director appointments when the
director is an active CEO and for the appointments of directors who have already won
a CEO award. However, in both cases the differences are not statistically significant.
The differences in appointment returns for CEO award winners, on the other hand,
are considerable and statistically significant. Consistent with our argument, we find
statistically significant and economically meaningful differences (0.85% vs. 0.17%).
An announcement return of 0.85% translated into an increase in market capitalization
2We define industries using the Fama-French 48 industry classifications. Using the Fama-French 12 industry
classification or 2-digit SIC Codes does not change our results
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of approximately $249 million for the average appointing firm in our sample. The
increase in market value is even more pronounced for the 5-day and 11-day event
window.
Next, we test our prediction in a formal model. The results of our multivariate
analysis are presented in 4. We find convincing evidence that, across our sample,
investor reactions are significantly stronger for the appointments of CEOs who have
won an award. The premium attached to announcements of directors who are CEOs
and have won an award at the time of the appointment (CEO×FirstAward) ranges
from 2.02% to 2.10% (column (1) to column (6) in Table 4). We call this the repu-
tation premium. Our findings provide direct evidence that reputation is recognized
and valued by investors. For a firm with average market capitalization in our sample,
the short-term value effect of the reputation premium is equivalent to $591 to $614
million.
Nevertheless, the findings could simply be a reflection of differences in perceived
director quality (Fich, 2005; Fahlenbrach et al., 2010) due to some directors in our
sample being active CEOs and some not, as we are looking at appointments across
the award winner’s careers, and quality can change over a career. To address this
problem, we re-estimate our baseline regression for subsample of outside director
appointments who are active CEOs. The results are reported in Table 5. Our results
further support our argument that investors attach value to director reputation.
Using a similar set of control variables, we find that appointments of outside directors
who have won an award yield, on average, a premium around 1%.
A natural follow-on question is whether the observed premium increases with the
number of CEO awards a CEO has won. Unreported analysis suggests that this is
9
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not the case. We conclude that while the second (or third) CEO award may still
further increase a CEO’s reputation, the second award, and any thereafter, do not
carry the same weight and are not reflected in investor reactions. Further, unreported
univariate results and the empirical findings of Masulis and Mobbs (2014) support
the notion that as directors become more reputable, they join the boards of larger
firms. Overall, the positive coefficient on FirstAward suggests that despite joining
the boards of larger firms, which is associated with a more negative reaction, CEO’s
who have won an award add value to the appointing firm.
5 Conclusion
Director reputation is a subject of study that has received increasing attention in re-
cent years. As primary agents to protect shareholder interests outside directors have
important fiduciary responsibilities. Given the limited incentive effects of director
compensation, reputation has been recognized as an important incentive device.
Unlike most economic systems, financial incentives are not the primary incen-
tive device the market for outside directors. Instead, director reputation has been
recognized as an essential commodity that governs director selection and determines
director effectiveness. This study introduces a novel way to study director reputation.
Exploiting an exogenous shift in reputation, induced by prestigious CEO awards, we
show that investors recognize and value the reputation of appointed outside direc-
tors. Moreover, we find that the appointment of a highly reputable director can
lead to significant short-term value effect. Further research might provide additional
insights by exploiting a similar methodology to study the long-term consequence of
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director reputation.
Most important, this study clearly documents the existence of a reputation pre-
mium. That alone is an interesting and new finding. We confirm the robustness
of the reputation premium for a subsample of CEO director appointments. Given
the large average firm size in our sample the reputation premium translates into an
economically meaningful short-term value effect.
While this study provides interesting additional insights and adds to our under-
standing of director reputation, further research is needed to evaluate the long-term
consequences of director reputation, implications for firm outcomes and ultimately
for shareholders.
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6 Tables
Table 1
Variable definitions
Variable Definition Data source
Panel A: Awards
First Award An indicator variable equal to 1 if the director
has won an award at the time of appointment.
CEO awards; LexisNexis
Total Number Awards The total number of awards the director wins
throughout his or her career.
CEO awards
Panel B: Director characteristics
CEO An indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is
a CEO at the time of appointment
NNDB; Who’s Who in Fi-
nance and Business, Execu-
comp
Other Chief Executive An indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is
a chief executive other than CEO at the time of
appointment
NNDB; Who’s Who in Fi-
nance and Business; Execu-
comp
Other Executive An indicator variable equal to 1 if the director
holds a non-chief executive position at the time
of appointment
NNDB; Who’s Who in Fi-
nance and Business; Execu-
comp
Retired An indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is
retired at the time of the appointment.
NNDB; Who’s Who in Fi-
nance and Business; Execu-
comp
Female An indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is
female
NNDB; Who’s Who in Fi-
nance and Business
Founder/CoFounder An indicator variable equal to 1 if the director
is a founder or co-founder of a publicly traded
company
NNDB; Who’s Who in Fi-
nance and Business
International Appointment An indicator variable equal to 1 if the director’s
primary work is outside the United States.
NNDB; Who’s Who in Fi-
nance and Business
Number of Board Seats Number of outside board seats director held at
time of appointment
LexisNexis, NNDB,
Bloomberg Businessweek,
RiskMetrics
More Than 4 Board Seats An indicator variable equal to 1 if the director
held more than 4 outside board seats at the time
of appointment.
LexisNexis, NNDB,
Bloomberg Businessweek,
RiskMetrics
Ph.D/J.D./M.D. An indicator variable equal to 1 if the director
has a Ph.D, J.D. or M.D.
NNDB; Who’s Who in Fi-
nance and Business
Ivy League An indicator variable equal to 1 if the director has
completed at least parts of his or her education
at an ivy league institution
NNDB; Who’s Who in Fi-
nance and Business
Panel C: Appointing and appointee firm characteristics
Assets ($M) Total assets. Compustat
Market Capitalization Market capitalization. CRSP
Market-to-Book Market capitalization over book equity. CRSP; Compustat
R&D Expense R&D expenditure over lagged assets. Missing val-
ues are substituted with zeros unless indicated.
Compustat
ROA Operating income before depreciation over lagged
assets.
Compustat
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics
The table below reports director-level descriptive statistics. The sample consists of 432 outside director appointments of
238 individual directors from 1977 to 2015. For every appointment we collect information from sources such as Who’s Who
in Finance and Business and NNDB. Balance sheet data is from Compustat and stock market data from CRSP. Cumu-
lative abnormal returns are computed using the market model for 1 year of trading data prior to the event window around
the director appointment. The number of observations are reported in column (1), mean and median in column (2) and (3)
respectively, standard deviation in column (4) and the 10th and 90th percentile in column (5) and (6).
Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. p10 p90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Director characteristics:
CEO 430 0.584 1 0.494 0 1
Other Chief Executive 430 0.042 0 0.201 0 0
Other Executive 430 0.107 0 0.309 0 1
Retired 430 0.265 0 0.442 0 1
Female 429 0.096 0 0.294 0 0
Founder/CoFounder 430 0.051 0 0.221 0 0
International Appointment 432 0.049 0 0.215 0 0
Number of Board Seats 430 2.177 2 1.337 1 4
More Than 4 Board Seats 432 0.1759 0 0.3812 9 1
PhD/J.D./M.D. 430 0.126 0 0.332 0 1
Ivy League 430 0.288 0 0.454 0 1
First Award 432 0.567 1 0.496 0 1
Total Number Awards 432 1.479 1 0.975 1 3
Appointing firm characteristics:
Assets ($M) 423 46,606 6,443 120,034 282 125,451
Market Capitalization 423 29,256 6,495 63,777 429 70,419
Market-to-Book 423 3.382 2.324 3.669 0.708 7.004
R&D Expense 417 0.059 0.005 0.183 0.000 0.138
ROA 423 0.133 0.146 0.113 0.013 0.253
ROA(t−1) 417 0.126 0.144 0.118 0.000 0.247
Appointing firm announcement returns:
CAR[-1,1] 407 0.003 0.002 0.038 -0.038 0.049
CAR[-2,2] 407 0.006 0.004 0.048 -0.048 0.058
CAR[-5,5] 408 0.004 0.001 0.079 -0.077 0.088
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Table 3
Univariate analysis: Investor reaction to outside director appointments
This table presents univariate results for the 3-day, 5-day and 11-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the
outside director appointments in our sample. We report mean and median cumulative abnormal returns. Panel A
compares CARs for CEO director appointments versus non-CEO director appointments. Panel B compares CARs
for a subsample of award winners vs. non-award winners and Panel C compares CARs for a subsample of directors
who are CEOs and have won an award to the remaining directors in the sample. We report we report a t-test for
means in column (3) and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for medians in column (4).
Panel A Outside director Outside director
is CEO is not CEO
Mean Mean t-Value z-Value
(Median) (Median) (t-test) (Wilcoxon test)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR[-1,1] 0.0060 -0.0002 1.614
(0.0025) (0.0001) 1.372
CAR[-2,2] 0.0074 0.0035 0.8197
(0.0060) (0.0002) 1.430
CAR[-5,5] 0.0082 -0.0007 1.125
(0.0043) (-0.0019) 0.970
Panel B Outside director Outside director
is award-winner is not award-winner
Mean Mean t-Value z-Value
(Median) (Median) (t-test) (Wilcoxon test)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR[-1,1] 0.0035 0.0033 0.0655
(0.0024) (0.0011) 0.373
CAR[-2,2] 0.0073 0.0039 0.7086
(0.0058 ) (0.0033) 0.518
CAR[-5,5] 0.0074 0.0009 0.8265
(0.0011) (-0.0050) 0.509
Panel C Outside director Outside director
is CEO and is not CEO and
award-winner not award-winner
Mean Mean t-Value z-Value
(Median) (Median) (t-test) (Wilcoxon test)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR[-1,1] 0.0085 0.0017 1.775∗
(0.0057 ) (0.0002) 1.969∗∗
CAR[-2,2] 0.0116 0.0038 1.789∗
(0.0084) (0.0015) 1.979∗∗
CAR[-5,5] 0.0172 0.0002 1.955∗∗
(0.0118) (-0.0030) 1.858∗
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Table 4
Multivariate analysis: Investor reaction to outside director appointments
This table reports regression results with the 3-day cumulative abnormal return associated with an outside direc-
tor appointment as dependent variable. The sample consists of 432 outside director appointments of 238 individual
directors from 1977 to 2015. An intercept is included in all regressions but not reported. t − statistics given in
parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and director-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and
∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
CAR[-1,1]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO × FirstAward 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0204∗∗∗ 0.0203∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗
(2.78) (2.75) (2.66) (2.63) (2.62) (2.66)
CEO -0.0142∗∗ -0.0141∗∗ -0.0138∗ -0.0137∗ -0.0142∗ -0.0147∗∗
(-2.00) (-1.98) (-1.92) (-1.91) (-1.96) (-2.03)
First Award -0.0126∗ -0.0126∗ -0.0115∗ -0.0115∗ -0.0114∗ -0.0119∗
(-1.94) (-1.93) (-1.75) (-1.72) (-1.72) (-1.81)
Total Number Awards -0.00193 -0.00191 -0.00188 -0.00195 -0.00196 -0.00193
(-0.89) (-0.84) (-0.82) (-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.86)
Other Chief Executive -0.00282 -0.00292 -0.00353 -0.00337 -0.00321 -0.00301
(-0.29) (-0.30) (-0.35) (-0.34) (-0.32) (-0.31)
Other Executive -0.0205∗∗∗ -0.0205∗∗∗ -0.0212∗∗∗ -0.0211∗∗∗ -0.0211∗∗∗ -0.0208∗∗∗
(-3.12) (-3.09) (-3.22) (-3.18) (-3.19) (-3.15)
Female -0.0180∗∗∗ -0.0178∗∗∗ -0.0183∗∗∗ -0.0185∗∗∗ -0.0188∗∗∗ -0.0190∗∗∗
(-3.46) (-3.35) (-3.43) (-3.37) (-3.35) (-3.39)
Founder/CoFounder -0.000977 -0.00159 -0.00182 -0.00172 -0.00186
(-0.14) (-0.22) (-0.26) (-0.24) (-0.27)
International Appointment -0.00130 -0.00201 -0.00170 -0.00117 -0.00138
(-0.19) (-0.30) (-0.24) (-0.16) (-0.20)
Number of Board Seats -0.00126 -0.00134 -0.00127
(-0.84) (-0.91) (-0.86)
More Than 4 Board Seats -0.00649
(-1.37)
Ph.D./J.D./M.D. -0.00327 -0.00321 -0.00330
(-0.62) (-0.61) (-0.61)
Ivy League 0.00124 0.00162 0.00158
(0.29) (0.37) (0.35)
Industry CEO 0.00617 0.00577
(0.61) (0.56)
LN(Assets) -0.00153 -0.00152 -0.00154 -0.00155 -0.00148 -0.00153
(-1.59) (-1.57) (-1.58) (-1.58) (-1.48) (-1.52)
Market-to-Book -0.00107∗ -0.00106∗ -0.00112∗ -0.00111∗ -0.00115∗ -0.00116∗
(-1.70) (-1.67) (-1.77) (-1.77) (-1.78) (-1.81)
R&D Expense -0.00328 -0.00302 -0.00121 -0.000521 -0.000181 -0.00170
(-0.15) (-0.14) (-0.06) (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.08)
ROA 0.0669∗ 0.0674∗ 0.0675∗ 0.0666∗ 0.0673∗ 0.0692∗∗
(1.96) (1.96) (1.93) (1.92) (1.94) (2.00)
ROA(t−1) -0.0237 -0.0240 -0.0234 -0.0227 -0.0219 -0.0245
(-0.59) (-0.60) (-0.57) (-0.55) (-0.53) (-0.59)
Observations 398 398 398 398 398 398
R2 0.067 0.067 0.069 0.070 0.071 0.073
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Table 5
Multivariate analysis: Investor reaction to CEO outside director appointments
This table reports regression results with the 3-day cumulative abnormal return associated with the appointment of
a CEO as outside director. The sample consists of 237 CEO outside director appointments. An intercept is included
in all regressions but not reported. t− statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for het-
eroskedasticity and director-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels.
CAR[-1,1]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Award 0.00921∗∗ 0.00936∗∗ 0.00966∗∗ 0.00969∗∗
(2.08) (2.08) (2.10) (2.10)
Total Number Awards -0.00220 -0.00224 -0.00223 -0.00225
(-0.84) (-0.85) (-0.85) (-0.86)
Female -0.0211 -0.0213 -0.0216 -0.0220
(-1.59) (-1.61) (-1.60) (-1.60)
Founder/CoFounder 0.000794 0.000572 0.000555 0.000587
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
International Appointment -0.0000542 -0.000608 -0.000871 -0.000401
(-0.01) (-0.07) (-0.10) (-0.05)
Number of Board Seats -0.000867 -0.000810 -0.000725
(-0.43) (-0.40) (-0.35)
Ph.D./J.D./M.D. -0.00418 -0.00409
(-0.70) (-0.68)
Ivy League -0.000636 -0.000252
(-0.11) (-0.04)
Industry CEO 0.00401
(0.35)
LN(Assets) -0.00268∗∗ -0.00266∗∗ -0.00267∗∗ -0.00259∗
(-2.02) (-1.98) (-1.99) (-1.84)
Market-to-Book -0.00125 -0.00128 -0.00124 -0.00129
(-1.45) (-1.48) (-1.43) (-1.41)
R&D Expense 0.00211 0.00336 0.00354 0.00218
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
ROA 0.0541 0.0542 0.0534 0.0535
(1.44) (1.42) (1.41) (1.40)
ROA(t−1 -0.0276 -0.0264 -0.0262 -0.0243
(-0.59) (-0.55) (-0.54) (-0.49)
Observations 237 237 237 237
R2 0.055 0.055 0.057 0.057
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